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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Juan Melendez appeals his sentence.  The first issue 
presented concerns a district court's authority to depart 
downward from a statutory minimum sentence based upon the 
defendant's substantial assistance with a criminal investigation 
where the government has moved under USSG §5K1.1 for a departure 
below the U.S. Sentencing Guideline range but has not moved under 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for a departure below the statutory minimum.  
We hold that, under such circumstances, a district court's 
authority under §5K1.1 to depart below the Sentencing Guideline 
range does not permit it to depart below a lower minimum sentence 
set by statute.  The second issue concerns Melendez's motion for 
a downward departure pursuant to application note 17 to USSG 
§2D1.1.  We agree with the district court that §2D1.1 application 
note 17 does not permit a district court to depart downward from 
a statutory minimum sentence.  The final issue concerns 
Melendez's contention that the district court should have 
permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea.  The record 
establishes that Melendez in fact did not attempt to withdraw his 
plea before the district court. 
 
  
 I. 
 Melendez and codefendant Edwin Moya were approached by 
confidential informants of the United States Customs Service 
posing as importers and transporters of cocaine.  This initial 
contact led to several meetings, during which Melendez, Moya, and 
the confidential informants discussed the availability of cocaine 
for distribution.  The discussions culminated in a meeting during 
which Melendez and Moya gave the confidential informants $10,000 
as a deposit toward the transportation expenses for 24 kilograms 
of cocaine.  The next day, the two codefendants deposited an 
additional $2500 for the transportation of the cocaine. 
 Shortly thereafter, Moya and Melendez were arrested by 
New York authorities on unrelated drug charges.  After their 
arrest, Moya's common law wife, Anna Maria Ferrara, her brother 
Raphael Ferrara, and her uncle Bienvenido Polanco, held further 
negotiations with the confidential informants for a 225-kilogram 
cocaine purchase.  Government agents ultimately made a controlled 
delivery of 30 kilograms of cocaine to Raphael Ferrara and 
Polanco.  Raphael Ferrara and Polanco were arrested shortly after 
taking possession of the drugs and Anna Maria Ferrara was 
arrested on the following day. 
 Melendez was charged with conspiring, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846, to distribute and to possess with intent to 
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, a crime that 
carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.  
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  He originally pleaded not guilty.  
Plea negotiations ensued, however, and Melendez ultimately signed 
  
a cooperating plea agreement.  The agreement provided, in 
pertinent part, that in return for Melendez's cooperation with 
the government's investigation and his pleading guilty, the 
government would move for a downward departure from the 
applicable Guideline range pursuant to USSG §5K1.1.  The 
agreement did not require the government to file a § 3553(e) 
motion to depart below the statutory minimum, however.  Melendez 
retracted his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the 
charged conspiracy.  
 The probation officer determined that the Guideline 
sentencing range applicable to Melendez's crime was 135 to 168 
months.  The government, in accordance with the agreement, moved 
for a downward departure from that Guideline range, pursuant to  
§5K1.1, in recognition of Melendez's substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another person.  The district 
judge granted that motion, and departed downward from the 
sentencing range set by the Guidelines.  However, because the 
government had not also moved pursuant to § 3553(e), the judge 
ruled that he had no authority to depart below the statutory 
minimum and meted out the 10-year minimum sentence required by 
statute.  Melendez maintains that this was error.  He argues that 
a §5K1.1 motion not only triggers the court's authority to depart 
downward from the sentencing level set by the Guidelines but also 
triggers the court's authority to depart below a lower, statutory 
minimum. 
 
 II. 
  
 The government maintains that Melendez waived or 
forfeited his right to appeal this issue, claiming that Melendez 
never formally argued to the district court that the government's 
§5K1.1 departure motion empowered the court to depart below the 
10-year statutory minimum.  To preserve the right to appeal a 
district court ruling, "it is sufficient that a party, at the 
time the ruling . . . is made or sought, makes known to the court 
the action which that party desires the court to take . . . and 
the grounds therefor."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 51.  Moreover, "[t]he 
general rule requiring counsel to make clear to the trial court 
what action they wish taken should not be applied in a 
ritualistic fashion.  If the problem has been brought to the 
attention of the court, and the court has indicated in no 
uncertain terms what its views are, to require an objection would 
exalt form over substance."  3A Charles A. Wright, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 842, 289-90 (1982 & Supp. 1994); see also 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 
(3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the government's contention that an 
issue was not preserved for appeal because the court had been 
made aware of the issue and because a contemporaneous objection 
would not have further aided the district court); cf. United 
States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, 757 F.2d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 
1985) (noting that the government did not waive its right to 
object to jury instructions because the court had been made 
"aware of the government's objection"); Bass v. Department of 
Agriculture, 737 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting the 
established rule in civil cases "that formal objection is not 
  
necessary if the trial judge was fairly apprised of the nature of 
the objection"). 
 Our review of the record reveals that Melendez in fact 
"[made] known to the court the action which [he] desire[d] the 
court to take."  As the Assistant United States Attorney admitted 
during the sentencing hearing:  "Both defendants through counsel 
have argued that the Court depart downward from this mandatory 
minimum."  (App. at 24a.)  Moreover, the district court was made 
well aware of the underlying legal debate over whether a §5K1.1 
motion permits a district court to depart below a statutory 
minimum.  The government admitted during the sentencing hearing 
that "[s]ome arguments indicate that the law doesn't require the 
Court to impose the mandatory minimum."  (App. at 24a.)  Most 
importantly, the district court clearly understood that Melendez 
was asserting these arguments; it expressly addressed and 
resolved the issue of the court's authority to depart below the 
statutory minimum.  In this context, there was no need for 
Melendez to take the additional step of repackaging the 
government's statement as his own formal objection to preserve 
his right to appeal.  Any such requirement would elevate form 
over substance.  Thus, we conclude that this issue is properly 
preserved for appeal and we will proceed to the merits of 
Melendez's argument. 
 
 III. 
 Congress has decreed that a person who distributes, or 
conspires to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine "shall 
  
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 
10 years."  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  This statute represents a 
Congressional judgment about the seriousness of this offense and 
the degree of sanction necessary to punish and deter this kind of 
conduct.   
 At the same time, Congress has recognized that the 
value to society of the cooperation of an individual charged with 
this kind of offense can, under some circumstances, outweigh the 
benefit to be derived from imposing the statutory minimum 
sentence.  Accordingly, Congress has authorized sentences below 
this and other statutory minima.  Section 3553(e) of Title 18 
provides: 
 (e) Limited authority to impose a sentence 
below a statutory minimum. -- Upon motion of 
the Government, the court shall have the 
authority to impose a sentence below a level 
established by statute as a minimum sentence 
so as to reflect a defendant's substantial 
assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.  Such sentence shall be 
imposed in accordance with the guidelines and 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 
28, United States Code. 
 Notably, Congress has authorized sentences below a 
statutory minimum only upon a prosecution's motion; that is, 
before a court may depart below a statutory minimum, the 
prosecutor first must determine that the value of the cooperation 
is sufficiently great to warrant overriding Congress's judgment 
concerning the minimum appropriate sentence.  By requiring a 
government motion, Congress thus gave the prosecutor the sole key 
  
that affords access to a sentence below a statutory minimum.  
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992). 
 That the prosecutor holds the sole key to the area 
below the statutory minimum does not mean that the sentencing 
court, once the prosecutor has made a § 3553(e) motion, has 
unbridled discretion to set a defendant's sentence, however.  As 
the final sentence of § 3553(e) reflects, Congress contemplated 
that the limited downward departure authority there bestowed on a 
sentencing court would be exercised in the context of, and in a 
manner consistent with, a system of Guidelines sentencing that 
was being constructed at the time of the passage of § 3553(e).  
Consistent with this approach, section 994(n) of Title 28 of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 directs the Sentencing Commission 
to formulate Guidelines that will reflect the general 
appropriateness of rewarding cooperation with sentences lower 
than they would otherwise be, including sentences below a 
statutory minimum.  Section 994(n) of Title 28 provides in 
pertinent part: 
 The [Sentencing] Commission shall assure that 
the guidelines reflect the general 
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence 
than would otherwise be imposed, including a 
sentence that is lower than that established 
by statute as a minimum sentence, to take 
into account a defendant's substantial 
assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense. 
 
 Although § 994(n) directs recognition of the principle 
that a lower sentence for cooperation can be appropriate, it says 
nothing about a process for identifying particular cases in which 
  
such a sentence may be appropriate.  Accordingly, nothing in the 
text of § 994(n) suggests that Congress intended by the passage 
of § 994(n) to take back the access key given to the prosecutor 
in § 3553(e).  The same can be said for the legislative history 
of § 994(n).  The most one can argue, from Melendez's 
perspective, is that § 994(n) may authorize the Commission to 
take back that key.  The text of § 994(n) does not seem to us to 
require that reading, however, and the legislative history 
provides no evidence of such an intent on the part of Congress.  
 Under § 994(n), the principle that a lower sentence for 
cooperation may be appropriate applies as well to sentences 
established by the Guidelines.  Here also § 994(n) says nothing 
about how particular cases appropriate for such sentences will be 
identified.  Thus, nothing in § 994(n) requires the Commission to 
give the prosecutor an exclusive access key to sentences below 
the Guideline range in return for cooperation. 
 The Commission exercised the authority given to it in 
this area by promulgating USSG §5K1.1.  That Guideline and its 
first application note provide in relevant part: 
 §5K1.1.  Substantial Assistance to 
Authorities  (Policy Statement) 
 
 Upon motion of the government stating that 
the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or  
  
 prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense, the court may depart 
from the guidelines.   
 
 * * * * 
 
 Application Notes: 
 
 1.  Under circumstances set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), as 
amended, substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense may 
justify a sentence below a statutorily 
required minimum sentence. 
 
 There are two things about this action of the 
Commission that seem to us important in the current context.  The 
first is that the sole authority granted in §5K1.1 is for 
departures "from the guidelines."  Given the express reference in 
the application note to statutes authorizing departures "below a 
statutorily required minimum sentence," we believe this 
limitation must represent an advertent decision on the part of 
the Commission to provide authority in the Guidelines only for 
departures below the Guideline range, leaving departures below 
statutory minima to the authority conferred by § 3553(e).1 
 Second, §5K1.1 reflects a policy decision on the part 
of the Commission to give the prosecutor a veto power over 
departures below the Guidelines range based on cooperation.  The 
Commission thus recognized the value of letting the prosecutor's 
                     
1
.  Where a statutory minimum is above the Guideline range, it 
becomes "the guideline sentence."  USSG §5G1.1(b).  We do not 
suggest that two motions are required in such circumstances.  A 
motion under either § 3553(e) or §5K1.1 will suffice to 
demonstrate that the requisite exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion has occurred.   
  
discretion control access to the area between the applicable 
Guideline range and any applicable, lower statutory minimum, just 
as § 3553(e) allows that discretion to control access to the area 
below a statutory minimum.   
 With this background, we turn to Melendez's argument.  
He must first ask us to conclude that Congress in § 944(n) 
authorized the Commission to take back the access key granted to 
the prosecutor in § 3553(e).  While we question this proposition, 
we may accept it arguendo here.  Melendez next insists that the 
Commission, while recognizing the value of allowing the 
prosecutor to control access to departures for cooperation below 
the Guideline range, created a system under which he or she can 
grant access to the area between the Guideline range and a lower 
statutory minimum only by surrendering his or her access control 
to the area below the statutory minimum.  Melendez tenders no 
persuasive reason, however, why the Commission might have chosen 
to create such a seemingly incongruent system. 
 The root issue for decision here is whether the 
prosecutor in a given case will be able to grant access to a 
Guideline departure for cooperation and at the same time retain 
control of access to a departure from a lower, statutory minimum.  
A literal reading of §5K1.1 would indicate that a prosecutor has 
this option.  This conclusion is consistent as well with the 
Congressional judgment reflected in § 3553(e).  Moreover, no 
policy considerations appear to counsel against this conclusion 
and a number counsel in favor.  Indeed, beyond this case, a 
denial of this option for the prosecution would appear to be in 
  
no one's best interest.  As Judge Easterbrook observed in his 
dissent in United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1994): 
 Section 3553(e) and Guideline 5K1.1 permit a 
prosecutor to offer a reward for assistance.  
This process works best if the amount of the 
reward can be graduated to the value of the 
assistance -- a value the prosecutor (who 
sees the full menu of crimes and potential 
cases in the district) can assess better than 
a judge. . . . [H]olding that a motion under 
either § 3553(e) or § 5K1.1 permits the judge 
to give any sentence he deems appropriate 
[will curtail] the prosecutor's ability to 
match the reward to the assistance.  When 
cooperation can be procured for a modest 
reduction, a lower sentence overcompensates 
the defendant, at the expense of the 
deterrence force of the criminal law.  
Another consequence is that there will be 
fewer motions of any kind.  If filing a 
motion under § 5K1.1 permits the judge to cut 
the sentence by three-quarters (as happened 
here), the prosecutor will insist on a great 
deal of assistance.  Many defendants are 
unlucky enough to have little of value to 
offer. . . . They are now condemned to serve 
the full authorized sentence, even though a 
prosecutor possessed of power to 
differentiate might reward slight aid with a 
slight reduction. 
       
 We hold that a motion under USSG §5K1.1 unaccompanied 
by a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not authorize a 
sentencing court to impose a sentence lower than a statutory 
minimum.2 
                     
2
.  In so concluding, we join the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.  United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 958 F.2d 1441 (8th 
Cir. 1992).  We respectfully disagree with the other courts of 
appeals that have addressed the same issue.  United States v. 
Wills, 35 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Beckett, 
996 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711 
  
 
 
 IV. 
 Melendez next argues that the government's confidential 
informants offered to sell him cocaine at prices substantially 
below market price, thereby leading him to purchase a 
significantly greater quantity of cocaine than he ordinarily 
would have been able to purchase given his available funds.  He 
maintains further that the $12,500 he had available for the drug 
deal would have enabled him to purchase, on the open market, only 
between one-half and three-quarters of a kilogram of cocaine 
instead of the more than 50 kilograms attributed to him by the 
district court.  These facts, he contends, mandate a downward 
departure under Application Note 17 to USSG §2D1.1.3 
 Melendez is not in a position to make these arguments, 
however. In his plea agreement, he specifically stipulated that 
(..continued) 
(9th Cir. 1991).  We note our accord with the thoughtful dissents 
in Wills and Keene. 
3
.  Application Note 17 states: 
 
 If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which 
a government agent sells or negotiates to 
sell a controlled substance to a defendant), 
the court finds that the government agent set 
a price for the controlled substance that was 
substantially below the market value of the 
controlled substance, thereby leading to the 
defendant's purchase of a significantly 
greater quantity of the controlled substance 
than his available resources would have 
allowed him to purchase except for the 
artificially low price set by the government 
agent, a downward departure may be warranted. 
  
his applicable Guideline range was 50 kilograms to 150 kilograms 
of cocaine.  Moreover, the probation report determined that the 
applicable quantity of cocaine to be 75 kilograms and neither 
Melendez's objections to the presentence report nor his 
sentencing letter to the district court requested that less than 
five kilograms should be attributed to him.  We accordingly 
conclude that the district court properly attributed more than 
five kilograms of cocaine to Melendez.   
 Having determined that the district court properly 
attributed in excess of five kilograms of cocaine to Melendez, 
the district court then was constrained to impose the statutory 
minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.  See, e.g., United 
States v. DeMaio, 28 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
a sentencing court may not depart below a statutory minimum on 
any ground other than substantial assistance to criminal 
investigation); United States v. Rudolph, 970 F.2d 467, 470 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant's diminished capacity, while 
grounds for departure from the Guidelines sentencing range, is 
not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by 
Congress), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1023 (1993); United States v. 
Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
defendant's aberrant behavior will not justify a departure below 
a statutory minimum). 
 
  
 V. 
 Finally, Melendez argues that the district court should 
have given him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea once he 
learned that the government did not intend to recommend a 
sentence below the 10-year statutory minimum.  This issue also 
was not properly preserved for appeal.  Although Melendez, in a 
brief filed pro se, maintains that he expressed his desire to 
withdraw his plea both in conversations with his attorney and in 
a letter to the court, nothing in the docket sheet or the record 
before this court supports those claims.  Moreover, Melendez 
failed to express his alleged desire to withdraw his plea when he 
addressed the court at his sentencing.  Because Melendez failed 
to raise this issue before the district court, we cannot address 
it here.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 359 F.2d 845, 846 
(3d Cir. 1966) (noting that questions cannot be presented on 
appeal that have not first been determined by the district 
court). 
 
 VI. 
 We will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 No. 93-5755 
HUYETT, District Judge, dissenting:  
 
 I join in Parts I, II, and V of the majority opinion, 
and respectfully dissent with respect to Parts III, IV, and VI.  
Although the issue is a close one, I believe the majority has 
erred in holding that when a sentencing court grants a USSG § 
5K1.1 motion to depart below the guideline sentence, the court 
may not impose a sentence below the statutory minimum unless the 
§ 5K1.1 motion is accompanied by a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e).  I believe the court should follow the position accepted 
in the majority of circuits that have considered this issue.  See 
United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Keene, 933 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1991).  But see United States v. 
Rodriguez-Morales, 958 F.2d 1441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- 
U.S.---, 113 S. Ct. 375, 121 L. Ed.2d 287 (1992). 
 The majority correctly reasons that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) are silent with respect to whether the 
prosecutor should be given exclusive access to sentences below 
the Guideline ranges.  I believe the majority errs, however, in 
determining that § 5K1.1 reflects the Sentencing Commission's 
advertent decision to give the prosecutor a veto over departures 
below the Guideline ranges and to leave departures below the 
statutory minima to the authority conferred by § 3553(e).     
  
 A careful reading of the sentencing guidelines and its 
commentary leads to an opposite conclusion.  Guideline commentary 
"that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless 
it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that 
guideline."  Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ---, ---, 113 S. 
Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L. Ed.2d 598 (1993).  With this direction in 
mind, I believe the court should give more careful consideration 
to the commentary to the guidelines.   
 Section 5K1.1 must be read together with application 
note 1 which reads: 
 Under circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), as amended, 
substantial assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense may justify a sentence 
below a statutorily required minimum 
sentence. 
USSG § 5K1.1 comment. (n.1).  I believe this note expresses the 
Sentencing Commission's intent that § 5K1.1 serve as a "conduit" 
for the application of § 3553(e), see Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d at 
493, and not an attempt to create two separate motions concerning 
substantial assistance.  Application Note 7 to USSG § 2D1.1, the 
guideline concerning drug offenses, further supports this 
interpretation and reads as follows: 
 Where a mandatory (statutory) minimum 
sentence applies, this mandatory minimum 
sentence may be "waived" and a lower sentence 
imposed (including a sentence below the 
applicable guideline range), as provided in 
28 U.S.C. §  994(n), by reason of a 
  
defendant's "substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense."  See § 
5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to 
Authorities). 
USSG § 2D1.1 comment. (n.7).  The reference to § 5K1.1 rather 
than to § 3553(e) illustrates the Commission's determination that  
departures from the statutory minimum sentence are a mere subset 
of departures from the guidelines.  This cross referencing, along 
with the substantial cross referencing between § 5K1.1, § 
3553(e), and § 994(n) supports the conclusion that the district 
court has discretion.  See Keene, 933 F.2d at 714.  
 I also disagree with the majority's view that "no 
policy considerations appear to counsel against this conclusion 
and a number counsel in favor" of its conclusion.  Majority Op. 
at ---.  Other circuits have ably raised policy considerations 
that counsel against the majority's position.  The Ninth Circuit, 
for example, reasoned that with regard to the powers conferred on 
the government by § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e), "[o]nce the motion is 
made by the government, a transfer of discretion regarding the 
range of departure could well frustrate Congress' goal of 
eliminating sentencing disparity given the absence of appellate 
review over the prosecutor's activity."  Keene, 933 F.2d at 715.  
In addition, an interpretation that provides two separate and 
distinct types of departure "would lead to a usurpation of the 
discretion of the district court."  Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d at 
494.   
  
 Although permitting the judge to depart below the 
guidelines or the statutory minimum on the basis of a § 3553(e) 
or § 5K1.1 motion curtails the prosecutor's ability to match the 
reward to the assistance, the defendant's sentence will still 
reflect his cooperation.  Judges are quite capable of making this 
determination and should be permitted to exercise their sound 
discretion.  See id.; Keene, 933 F.2d at 714.   
 I would vacate the sentence imposed by the district 
court and remand this case for resentencing.  Therefore, I 
dissent. 
